U.N.'s Special Committee Against Apartheid suspicious that a major realignment was taking place on the African continent, but it remained largely in the dark about the details of military cooperation between the two countries. The committee began to collect evidence that Israel was helping South Africa circumvent European boycotts of its products, from fruit to textiles, by re-exporting South African goods under Israeli labels.[90] At the time, Abdul Minty, head of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London, was particularly concerned about a joint Israeli–South African campaign to promote the sale of their orange juice in British supermarkets, which he regarded as "just one illustration of the growing links . . . that are contributing directly to the maintenance of apartheid and white domination in South Africa."[91] In the coming years, Minty and the Special Committee Against Apartheid would have much more than orange juice to worry about.

5

BROTHERS IN ARMS

A Military Alliance Is Born

Small nations do not have a foreign policy. They have defense policy.
—Moshe Dayan[1]

MAGNUS MALAN WAS GREETED by scenes of utter devastation when he arrived in Israel in late 1973.* On the northern border with Syria, South Africa's newly appointed army chief gazed out over battlefields littered with the charred remains of tanks.[2] Israel had fought back to win the Yom Kippur War, but at a devastating cost. Over 2,500 IDF soldiers were killed in the span of less than three weeks; for a nation of just over three million people, it was the equivalent of the United States losing 175,000 men.[3] Leading generals were forced to haul the bodies of their sons from trenches and interrupt news briefings to receive news of other fallen family members. Just a month after this bitter victory, Israel lost its founding father. David Ben-Gurion suffered a massive brain hemorrhage in mid-November and died two weeks later, on December 1.

Malan was hosted in Israel by General Yonah Efrat, an old pal from his days at the American Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas—an elite military finishing school that had trained everyone from Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton to the leaders of countless Latin American military coups.[4] It was there that Malan learned the counterinsurgency techniques that helped shape his handling of the conflict in Southern Africa. He became close friends with Efrat and his wife during their time in Kansas and they stayed in touch after graduating in 1963. Efrat, who helped conquer the Old City of Jerusalem

* Magnus Malan is distantly related to former prime minister D. F. Malan.

in 1967, was a rising star in the Israeli army by the time Malan came to Israel. "Having Yonah Efrat there made entrée to the military and most of the generals very easy," he recalls.[5] As Malan began to lay the foundation for an Israeli–South African alliance, these contacts were crucial.

The Yom Kippur War left the Israeli economy in shambles, and the arms industry was quickly becoming its biggest export earner. Washington's refusal to resupply Israel in the opening days of the war convinced the Israelis that they could not rely on their American allies for military hardware, prompting a massive expansion of the domestic arms industry. The war had cost Israel an entire year's worth of its gross national product, yet the government still managed to increase military expenditures by 40 percent in 1974.[6]

Like the economy, the Israeli political establishment was in disarray. In the spring of 1974, a postwar commission of investigation lambasted the IDF chief of staff for not giving the army sufficient warning of an imminent attack, but it largely let Defense Minister Dayan off the hook and went so far as to praise Meir for her handling of the war. The public was outraged at the commission for absolving the country's leaders; protesters flooded the streets clamoring for Dayan and Meir to step down. Weary and unable to continue, Meir resigned on April 10, unleashing a decidedly undemocratic race for the premiership that would be left to the Labor Party's leadership to decide.[7] The presumed favorite was Finance Minister Pinchas Sapir, a longtime power broker within the party. But Sapir withdrew his name early on, telling Yitzhak Rabin he'd rather jump from the tenth floor of a building than serve as prime minister. The eloquent foreign minister, Abba Eban, wanted to run but was advised that he didn't have a chance, due to his lack of strong support within the Labor Party. That left the two young lions of Labor—Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin—to battle each other for the prime minister's office. Their differences were more style than substance. Peres, the technocratic whiz kid, had the support of Dayan's old loyalists, while Rabin had proven himself a consummate battlefield leader and Washington dealmaker. Eventually, after a narrow 298–254 vote in the party's central committee, Rabin emerged as prime minister.[8] Internal party politics forced him to offer Peres the job of defense minister as a consolation

prize, much to his chagrin. Rabin did not consider Peres up to the job because he lacked combat experience and later wrote that the appointment was "an error I would regret."[9]

With arms production booming, Peres took charge of rebuilding Israel's battered military. Though he had never risen above the rank of sergeant in the army, Peres had extensive defense policy experience and quickly earned the respect of the top brass—if not the prime minister's.[10]

Israel's nascent arms industry brought in much needed foreign currency, helped redress the country's severe trade imbalance, and provided work for countless engineers and scientists returning from overseas with advanced degrees.[11] It also forced factories to produce in excess of the IDF's own requirements. Higher volume meant lower costs, and it was only a matter of time before the arms industry had to find export markets to offset research and development costs and absorb its surplus supply.[12] Israel's defense contractors sought to fill every niche for its own armed forces and those of other countries—all without the help of foreign suppliers. Their goal was to prove Israel's military superiority to its Arab enemies despite the advanced Soviet technology nations such as Egypt and Syria possessed.[13]

Prior to the Yom Kippur War, the arms industry had seen only a modest increase in exports, but after the war, production increased and external sales skyrocketed.[14] Total exports for all Israeli arms producers would increase nearly fifteenfold from $70 million in 1973 to nearly $1 billion in 1981.[15] The government even began to push arms exports as the key to resolving Israel's economic woes, using expanded military budgets to stimulate the economy during recessions and election campaigns.[16] Selling weapons was not the only source of income for the defense industry; Israel also modernized the aging weapons systems of foreign armies and provided training for soldiers in countries ranging from Colombia and Sri Lanka to Mobutu's Zaire.[17]

As Israel's military-industrial complex grew, an increasingly influential cadre of IDF officers who moved from the battlefield to the boardroom began to lobby for the defense industry at every opportunity.[18] These included decorated generals like Moshe Dayan and other prominent defense officials such as Shimon Peres. This "security network" wielded enormous power at the upper levels of government and industry.[19] Israel's economy was plagued by inflation during the 1970s, and the defense sec-

tor was a rare bright spot: a highly educated workforce and sophisticated technological base allowed weapons makers and dealers to flourish.

Before long, this thriving industry would have an eager new customer. The precarious security situation of the apartheid regime was deteriorating, and Pretoria wanted all the arms it could get. To the Israeli Defense Ministry, South Africa seemed the ideal customer: a developing country with a defense-conscious, right-wing government that did not have close ties to the Arab-Muslim bloc.[20] It was a perfect match.

. . .

IN LATE FEBRUARY 1974, a small book titled *Portugal and the Future* was published in Lisbon. The author, General António de Spínola, was a renowned veteran of Portugal's colonial wars in Africa, and the impact of his book would be felt across two continents. Upon returning to Portugal, the general had tried in vain to convince his government to grant autonomy to the colonies. Spínola's book argued that Portugal's colonial wars—including those in Angola and Mozambique—could never be won. It was a message that stunned and excited his countrymen. When Portuguese dictator Marcello Caetano read the book cover to cover in the wee hours of the morning just before it hit newsstands, he knew his days were numbered. Two months later, Spínola launched a coup, deposed Caetano, and took power.[21]

The Portuguese soon began to formally withdraw from Angola, paving the way for its independence. Suddenly, South Africa was faced with two Soviet-supported regimes on its doorstep in Angola and Mozambique, with a dying white supremacist regime fading fast in neighboring Rhodesia. Pretoria had long relied on these colonial "buffer states" as a front-line defense against the rest of black Africa. Now they were gone, and the successor regimes were openly hostile toward the apartheid government. To add to the complications, an independence movement was brewing in Namibia (formerly known as South-West Africa). In 1971, the International Court of Justice had ruled that South Africa's presence in Namibia—a relic of the post–World War I League of Nations mandate granting South Africa rights to the former German colony—was illegitimate and that the territory should be administered by the U.N. As the Portuguese began to loosen their grip on Angola, the

South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) established bases in southern Angola to fight for Namibian independence.

South African leaders began to view themselves as under siege. P. W. Botha—once Prime Minister D. F. Malan's youthful lieutenant—had risen through the ranks of the National Party in Pretoria to become a powerful political force in his own right. In 1966, Botha—also known as *Die Groot Krokodil* (the Big Crocodile) for his ruthlessness and stubbornness—became defense minister. Botha believed that South Africa's enemies were trying to foment a Marxist revolution in the region and overthrow the white regime in Pretoria.[22] In response to what Botha considered a "total onslaught," South African defense spending increased dramatically. Beginning in the early 1970s, the budget tripled to over R1 billion by 1975 ($1.35 billion in 1975 dollars).

While Botha obsessed over the communist threat across the border, his colleagues set about purging South Africa of its black citizens. Appropriating the rhetoric of decolonization, the Vorster administration began to establish "independent, self-governing" black homelands (also known as bantustans) on some of the nation's least desirable land in an attempt to fool the West into thinking Pretoria had granted independence to blacks. Information Minister Connie Mulder, who had been in Tel Aviv meeting with Abba Eban and other high-level officials as Israel's Africa policy collapsed, declared, "If our policy is taken to its full conclusion, there will not be one black man with South African citizenship. There will then no longer be a moral obligation on our Parliament to accommodate these people politically."[23] As the bantustans gained "independence" in the early 1970s, millions of black South Africans were forcibly relocated to these rural puppet states; Mulder and his spin doctors claimed it was self-determination and billed the policy "separate development."

As news of the inhumane apartheid legislation spread, South Africa's international isolation deepened. Pretoria's fledgling arms industry dreamed of becoming self-sufficient, but in the meantime the government was desperate to buy weapons from any willing seller.[24] Money was not an obstacle; in the late 1960s South Africa had enjoyed higher growth rates than most of the industrialized world (apart from Japan), seeing its gross national product increase 5 to 10 percent per year. The price of gold skyrocketed in the wake of the mid-1970s oil crisis, rising from under $100 per ounce in 1972 to over $800 in 1980.[25] Coal prices soared and ura-

nium prices quintupled during the same period, and South Africa rode this mineral export boom. Flush with cash, Pretoria continued to buy arms from France and other European countries, but it was becoming clear that Israel was a more reliable supplier. Whereas in the past discussions of military matters had been held quietly by junior officials in Paris, the two countries were now ready for a more formal and far-reaching arrangement. The French back channel was no longer necessary and high-level talks between the Israeli and South African defense ministers soon began.[26]

In November 1974, Shimon Peres came to Pretoria to meet secretly with South African leaders. After the trip, he wrote to his hosts thanking them for helping to establish a "vitally important" link between the two governments. Peres—who routinely denounced apartheid in public—went on to stress that "this cooperation is based not only on common interests and on the determination to resist equally our enemies, but also on the unshakeable foundations of our common hatred of injustice and our refusal to submit to it." Peres predicted that "the new links which you have helped to forge between our two countries will develop into a close identity of aspirations and interests which will turn out to be of long-standing benefit to both our countries."[27] Over the next two decades, Peres's prediction would prove to be remarkably accurate.

He met South African defense minister P. W. Botha the following year in Switzerland, and it was there that the two ministers laid the foundation for an enduring military relationship.[28] They also signed the original ISSA (Israel–South Africa) agreement, according to Dieter Gerhardt, then a high-ranking South African naval officer, who saw the thick document when it was circulated for discussion throughout the South African military establishment.[29]

Gerhardt was born in South Africa to German parents and he grew up speaking their language at home and attending a German school. His father had Nazi sympathies and was interned during World War II along with militant Afrikaner nationalists. Dieter did not share his father's radical right-wing politics and, as he grew older, he started to rebel against his parents, the Church, and everything about his austere upbringing.[30] As a teenager, he attended a high school for navy cadets. Despite his liberal politics, Dieter did what was expected of him after graduation and joined the South African Navy.

Gerhardt recalls the original ISSA agreement that Peres and Botha produced as "a very detailed layout of how they were going to cooperate on a technical level" and how each country would store spare weapons and parts for the other. It also established procedures for keeping everyone outside the defense and intelligence establishment in the dark. Indeed, the Israeli–South African relationship was quickly becoming the exclusive domain of the defense ministries and heads of state. Beginning in 1974, the two governments began holding biannual gatherings for Defense Ministry and arms industry officials. Likewise, military intelligence officials convened annually, alternating between Tel Aviv and Pretoria, to discuss strategic cooperation.[31]

In January 1975, South Africa hosted visiting Israeli Air Force officers in Pretoria. The group, chaired by military intelligence chief Hein du Toit, addressed Soviet and Chinese influence in Africa, weapons sales to African and Arab states, Soviet and Arab naval movements in the Indian Ocean, and, most importantly, "Palestinian terrorist organizations and [their] cooperation with terrorist organizations that operate in Southern Africa."[32] Du Toit's staff also passed information to Israel about a ship bound for the Red Sea port of Aqaba with a cargo of ammunition, igniters, and gunpowder destined for the Jordanian army.[33] Israeli officials were more focused on financing for new weapons systems; they saw themselves as experts on war and did not seek advice from South Africans when it came to counterinsurgency and combat. "They were more interested in what we could supply them [with] than what we could teach them," du Toit recalls, reminiscing over a shot of whiskey in his suburban Pretoria home. More than anything, the Israelis wanted access to the massive—and largely untapped—export market that South Africa represented for its defense industry.

On March 31, 1975, leading Israeli and South African defense officials met again. This time, rather than exchanging intelligence, they came to do business, discussing the sale of tanks, missile boats, and the joint development of airplane engines. Most significantly, the Israeli delegation formally offered to sell South Africa some of the nuclear-capable

Jericho missiles in its arsenal—the same missiles that were readied for use during the Yom Kippur War.[34] South Africa's leaders yearned for a nuclear deterrent—which they believed would force the West to intervene on their behalf if Pretoria were ever seriously threatened—and the Israeli proposition put that goal within reach. Excited by the offer on the table, R. F. Armstrong, chief of staff of the South African Defence Force (SADF), wrote an enthusiastic memo analyzing the benefits of nuclear weapons for South Africa's defense strategy and sent it to his boss later that day.[35] Armstrong argued that purchasing the Jericho missiles would provide South Africa with a deterrent if Russia or China became more invested in the Southern African conflict. Armstrong attached maps of the Jericho's three-hundred-mile range and praised its accuracy. He concluded by recommending that South Africa purchase the weapons despite the high cost because, he believed, a nuclear capability would make the West take Pretoria seriously.[36]

Three days later, on April 3, 1975, Peres and Botha signed a security and secrecy agreement governing all aspects of the new defense relation-

(From left) South African propaganda chief Eschel Rhoodie, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, South African intelligence head Hendrik van den Bergh, and Israeli defense minister Shimon Peres at the Prime Minister's Residence, Jerusalem, April 11, 1975.
CREDIT: DAVID RUBINGER

ship. The agreement, known by its abbreviation SECMENT, even provided for denial of its own existence, stating: "It is hereby expressly agreed that the very existence of this Agreement . . . shall be secret and shall not be disclosed by either party."[37] The SECMENT agreement would remain in force for an indefinite period and dictated that neither party could unilaterally renounce it.[38]

Israel's offer of nuclear missiles, code-named "Chalet," came up again two months later, on June 4, when Peres and Botha held a second meeting in Zurich.[39] Now the discussion turned to warheads. Minutes from the June meeting reveal that Botha expressed interest in buying the Jerichos if they came with "the correct payload," and that "Minister Peres said that the correct payload was available in three sizes."[40] Armstrong's exclusive focus on nuclear-armed Jerichos in his March 31 memorandum makes clear that Botha was talking about nuclear warheads when he asked for "the correct payload." Eventually Botha backed out of the deal—due to its high costs and the fact that planning for nuclear weapons in South Africa was only in its early stages—and the nuclear transfer never occurred.[41] The abortive deal in 1975 was only the beginning of Israeli–South African cooperation on nuclear missile technology, however: a decade later, the two countries would begin work on a secret testing range along South Africa's rugged Indian Ocean coast.

Nuclear missiles notwithstanding, the Israelis were extremely eager to sell anything and everything to Pretoria, including weapons from third parties. South Africa conveniently used Israel as an intermediary to buy arms from countries off limits to them because of embargoes.[42] This much was clear from a 1975 Israeli Defense Ministry letter informing the South Africans that one of their orders could not be filled because the item "is at present not available and we have instructed our Purchasing Missions abroad to scan every available source."[43]

South Africa was growing desperate, and increasingly Israel was the only country willing to help it. Having returned to Downing Street in 1975 after four years of Tory rule, British prime minister Harold Wilson abrogated the Simonstown Agreement, a naval treaty that had maintained close military ties between South Africa and the United Kingdom and allowed the British Royal Navy to use the strategically positioned Simonstown Base, which guards the waters surrounding the Cape of Good Hope. France continued to sell some weapons to South Africa but pres-

sure was increasing to abide by the voluntary 1963 U.N. arms embargo—a measure that became mandatory in 1977. At Henry Kissinger's urging, President Gerald Ford's administration was still helping Pretoria, but this source, too, would soon dry up in the face of mounting anti-apartheid pressure in Congress. Only Israel remained steadfast.

In addition to selling existing weapons, the Israelis were also intent on convincing the South Africans to join them in developing new ones. Israel possessed a great deal of scientific expertise and advanced technology, but South Africa had more money and Pretoria was an attractive partner for financing such projects. The defense ministers discussed South African purchases of new Israeli tanks at $810,000 per unit, but Peres was much more concerned about securing South African investment in his ambitious projects to build a lightweight fighter aircraft engine and a longer-range missile code-named "Burglar." Peres had initially asked South Africa to finance 25 percent of the aircraft project and 33 percent of the missile project. In the end, however, Botha declined the latter, claiming "we have no aggressive intentions" and hence no need for long-range missiles.[44] Turned down by the South Africans, Israel resorted to its strategy of the periphery, initiating a joint missile project with Iran, code-named "Flower," that would continue until the fall of the Shah in 1979.[45]

The minutes of the third ISSA meeting—held in Pretoria on June 30, 1975—for the first time put a concrete price tag on the Israeli–South African relationship. At this meeting, the two countries closed a deal for two hundred tank engines with a total value of $84 million. In addition, they negotiated a massive ammunition purchase from the arms manufacturer IMI, Israel Military Industries, totaling over $100 million.[46] These deals alone accounted for the bulk of Israel's total arms exports in 1975.[47]

Little did the top brass know that each line of every one of these top secret contracts was being scrutinized in Moscow. Unbeknownst to his colleagues, Dieter Gerhardt was not just a commodore in the South African Navy; he had been working as a spy for the Soviet Union's military intelligence wing, the GRU, since the 1960s.

By mid-1975, Angola was descending into chaos. An agreement signed in the Portuguese town of Alvor in January had given the feuding liberation movements only nine months to prepare for a democratic election. "During five hundred years of colonial domination, the Portuguese had done nothing to prepare [Angola] for self-determination," writes former U.S. State Department official Witney Schneidman. "It was now about to be granted independence essentially overnight."[48] The Portuguese were leaving in droves and full-scale civil war seemed inevitable.

The Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA in Portuguese) was vying for power with other armed independence movements. Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) movement and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were receiving funds and military advice from China, Romania, and neighboring Zaire and Zambia. Despite this aid, South African intelligence predicted an MPLA victory in the absence of Western or South African intervention, and soon Pretoria began supplying weapons to the FNLA and UNITA and preparing its own forces for action. The prospect of a Soviet-backed MPLA government in Angola terrified Pretoria and threatened to disrupt the Cold War balance of power. Both Vorster and Kissinger preferred the MPLA's rivals; even if they were receiving funds from Beijing and Bucharest, an FNLA or UNITA government would not expand the Soviet sphere of influence.

Winks and nods from Washington encouraged the anti-MPLA forces and prompted Vorster to approach U.S. president Gerald Ford for arms.[49] He was not disappointed. Between July and August 1975, the United States provided $25 million in covert aid to anti-MPLA forces in Angola. As the MPLA secured large swaths of territory at the expense of the northern FNLA and southern UNITA movements, South African Defence Force units crossed the border from South African–controlled territory into Angola and occupied two major dams that were part of a South African hydroelectric project.[50]

Faced with a growing threat from the north, the top brass in Pretoria dispatched Dieter Gerhardt and two other high-ranking officials to Israel. Their assignment was to learn as much as they could from the IDF's recent battlefield experience, with a focus on strategic planning and operations. Chief of Staff Armstrong, who had enthusiastically recommended purchasing Israeli nuclear missiles a few months earlier, saw Israel as "probably the only country that would be prepared to pass on"

the information about contemporary Soviet weaponry that South Africa so desperately needed.[51] Given that the South Africans were preparing to invade Angola a few weeks later, they needed all the help they could get.

The full-scale invasion of Angola began in October 1975. The SADF attacked bases belonging to SWAPO—the Namibian independence movement—in southern Angola and pushed north with their UNITA allies. Meanwhile, CIA-funded FNLA and Zairean troops closed in on Luanda. Angola was quickly becoming a major Cold War battleground and the Soviet Union and its allies were not prepared to sit out the fight.[52]

On November 4, Fidel Castro dispatched Cuban troops to Southern Africa, beginning an intervention that would last more than a decade and send upward of forty thousand Cubans to Angola, dwarfing Castro's previous forays into African liberation wars in Algeria, Zaire, and elsewhere.[53] The Cubans were airlifted with the aid of both Soviet military aircraft and chartered planes from Aeroflot.[54] Without the Cuban presence, South Africa almost certainly would have prevailed; with Castro's troops on the ground, the war took an entirely different course.

Ford administration officials did not foresee the large-scale Cuban intervention, nor did they consider the fallout in Congress and the damage to the United States' image that an apparent alliance with apartheid South Africa would cause.[55] The Congress elected in the wake of the Watergate scandal was radically antiwar and intensely suspicious of foreign interventions and covert operations.[56] The fall of Saigon and America's humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam just a few months before was fresh in the minds of legislators, and the specter of another potential Vietnam in the jungles of Africa did not appeal to them.

Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, traveled to Angola in late 1975 and met with FNLA leader Holden Roberto, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, and MPLA leader Agostinho Neto. Clark returned to Washington and told CIA director William Colby that he thought covert aid to the Angolans was "a bad idea"; soon afterward, he proposed an amendment barring such funds.[57] In December 1975, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to discontinue covert aid to Angola.[58] President Ford fumed that members of Congress "had lost their guts," and by early 1976 the flow of American funds to the anticommunist forces in Angola had slowed to a trickle.[59]

Politically and economically isolated, South Africa withdrew from Angola after the Clark Amendment passed and concentrated its troops in northern Namibia.[60] They felt betrayed and abandoned and never forgave the Americans.[61] As P. W. Botha complained bitterly to Parliament: "They encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch."[62]

In 1975, Israel encountered a rough patch with its patrons in Washington as well. Following the Yom Kippur War, the United States had assumed the role France had played until 1967 and began supplying the Israelis with military aid on a large scale; much of it was quickly reinjected into the U.S. economy because the Israelis used it to buy American-made weaponry.[63] But Israel remained skittish about relying too heavily on the United States, and these fears proved to be well founded.

In early 1975, talks between Israel and Egypt came to a standstill over the question of further disengagement in the Sinai Peninsula, where Israeli troops had remained deployed after the Yom Kippur War as a buffer against future Egyptian attacks. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat argued that Israeli withdrawal was necessary to prove to his people that the 1973 war effort had been as much of a victory as his government had claimed. Despite Henry Kissinger's urgings, Israel did not budge.

President Ford became impatient with Israel's intransigence and declared in March that he would "reassess" American relations with Israel, claiming the United States "would not finance a state of deadlock that would damage its interests."[64] For a period of seven months, Washington halted economic aid and significantly reduced military aid to the Israelis.[65] Ford refused to sell them F-15 fighter jets and missiles and expressed fears that a new war in the region could lead to another damaging oil embargo, such as the one imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. The American move caused Rabin to reconsider his excessive reliance on Washington.[66] He resented Ford for signaling to Israel's enemies that the Jewish state was still dependent on the United States and could be forced to make concessions in order to obtain arms. Meanwhile, the Soviets were rearming Arab states with no similar strings attached.[67]

Dieter Gerhardt was busy spying on Israel in the fall of 1975, and he had a front-row seat to Israeli strategic planning during the reassessment crisis. Much of what Gerhardt saw and heard during his trip confirmed that the Israelis were hedging their bets to avoid relying exclusively on the United States for their security. Increasingly, Israel viewed South Africa as a crucial pillar of its defense strategy.

While in Israel, Gerhardt was hosted by General Abrasha Tamir, who told him that the country needed "another leg to stand on" if the United States ever left it out to dry again.[68] Israel was looking for a nation that "could invest enough in our projects so that they could be pursued independently," a role that South Africa was beginning to play, thanks to Shimon Peres's work in Pretoria.[69]

With Tamir, Gerhardt visited IMI; Israel Aircraft Industries' research and development division; the Defense Ministry's central computing division; and the Lakam scientific intelligence service. Gerhardt took careful notes and sent all of them on to his minders in Moscow. Only when he was captured years later and revealed all that he knew did the Israeli security establishment realize how many of its most sensitive military secrets had been passed to the enemy.[70]

By the end of September 1975, the crisis had passed. The U.S.-Israeli relationship was now sufficiently strong to survive this kind of diplomatic tiff, and thanks to pressure from Congress and Jewish organizations in Washington the flow of American arms to Israel resumed. In the meantime, Rabin's popularity had skyrocketed. Rather than caving in to American pressure, he had hardened his negotiating position and sought alternative allies.[71] Indeed, it was precisely during the months when the Ford administration was "reassessing" its relations with Israel that Shimon Peres was busy meeting with P. W. Botha and leading South African defense officials, negotiating deals that promised to infuse the struggling Israeli economy with nearly $200 million.[72] When Israel was briefly left out in the cold by the United States, South Africa had enthusiastically welcomed it as a partner.

The reassessment crisis drove home the lesson that selling arms, or withholding them, was increasingly becoming a crucial diplomatic tool for the United States. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, the political scientist

Andrew Pierre noted that old displays of force such as formal alliances and foreign bases were on the way out. Instead, major powers were inclined "to shore up friendly states through the provision of arms."[73] Or, as Henry Kissinger later put it more bluntly in his memoirs, "contrary to what my colleagues at Harvard have been teaching for 10 years, history shows you get much more influence with military sales than with economic aid."[74] For Israel, arms sales were becoming a form of diplomacy as well.[75] Israel sold to unfriendly states, including post-revolutionary Iran, under the pretext that these arms sales would ensure good treatment of Jews.[76] The same argument was advanced to rationalize sales to South Africa, though the true motives were far less noble. Arms sales to Pretoria were really driven by the massive revenues they generated for the Israeli government's coffers.

. . .

AS DEFENSE COOPERATION between Israel and South Africa intensified, politicians in both countries began to come out of hiding. In 1976, Prime Ministers Vorster and Rabin decided that it was time to make a public show of friendship, even if they continued to conceal the underlying reasons for their bond.

Vorster had long doubted that Israel would ever invite him to visit because of his World War II allegiances. However, as relations warmed after the Yom Kippur War, Vorster decided to test the water. It would be the first visit by a South African head of state since D. F. Malan's pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1953. And unlike most high-profile diplomatic initiatives, the South African Foreign Ministry had virtually nothing to do with it. Vorster authorized Hendrik van den Bergh, Information Minister Connie Mulder, and Mulder's deputy, Eschel Rhoodie, to bypass the Foreign Ministry and arrange a trip to Israel to meet with defense and intelligence officials.

Rhoodie was a master operator. Tall, handsome, cosmopolitan, and refined in his tastes, he could hold forth on the relative charms of the George V and Hôtel de Crillon in Paris, wowing his less cultivated South African colleagues with his sophistication and puzzling them with his quirky habit of shunning alcohol and meat—staples of any self-respecting Afrikaner male's diet. The son of a prison warden, Rhoodie

went on to earn his doctorate from the University of Pretoria. After a brief stint as a star provincial rugby player, he pursued his true passion: selling South Africa to the world. Brash, confident, and quick to get things done, he was a hit with the Israelis.[77]

While the official diplomats advocated treading cautiously, Rhoodie and van den Bergh made a strong alliance with Israel their priority.[78] Rhoodie believed that "Israel and South Africa formed the two pillars supporting the Free World's strategic interest in Africa and the Middle East." He and van den Bergh firmly believed that both countries were surrounded by hostile, implacable enemies and sought to convince the rest of the world that if either government fell, the odds were good that black African countries and Arab states would gang up against the other, endangering vital oil supplies in the Middle East and strategically valuable mineral supplies in Southern Africa. They saw the partnership as a rare example of two isolated states joining hands and striking out on their own and concluded that an Israeli–South African alliance would therefore have "great historical significance." Although the clandestine military alliance was already well established, Rhoodie and van den Bergh wanted to deliver a diplomatic victory for the embattled Vorster regime—a task that would require staging a public display of affection for South Africa.[79]

Rhoodie laid the groundwork for Vorster's visit while Peres was in Pretoria in 1974 and continued on a series of subsequent visits to Israel.[80] Vorster's secretly planned trip was news to the South African ambassador in Tel Aviv, Charles Fincham, as well as Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller and his secretary, Brand Fourie.[81] Rhoodie's shadow foreign ministry had arranged everything behind their backs. Even Ambassador Unna had surprisingly little to do with the arrangements, although he did join Vorster on the trip.[82]

As we have seen, South African prime minister Vorster began his five-day state visit by touring the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial on April 9, 1976.[83] The South African leader faced surprisingly little opposition while visiting Israel. Apart from a few mildly critical newspaper articles, Israelis seemed to collectively shrug their shoulders.[84] *The Jerusalem Post* even praised Vorster for "recharting his country's racial and foreign policy" and being a rare breed of leader "who has not flinched from the political perils of re-educating his people in that direction."[85]

South African prime minister B. J. Vorster, left, at the Wailing Wall, April 1976.
CREDIT: RAHAMIM ISRAELI

Arthur Goldreich was one of the few anti-Vorster protesters out in the streets. As the escaped fugitive plastered telephone poles with posters featuring Vorster's name alongside swastikas, he was confronted by passersby, including one elderly man who spat on his poster. At first he thought the man might be a disgruntled South African immigrant who supported apartheid, then he got a closer look at the vandal. "He had an Auschwitz number on his arm," Goldreich recalls, still shaken three decades later by the memory of the confrontation. The Holocaust survivor lashed out at Goldreich, telling him, "We will make agreements with the devil to save Jews from persecution and to secure the future of this state." He was left speechless as the old man walked away. "That was the climate of the time," Goldreich recalls with dismay.[86]

The old man's diatribe represented the views of the young, security-minded technocrats running the country as much as those of the older generation of fearful Holocaust survivors. There was an acute sense that Israel's existence was threatened and that most of the world didn't care—and that those who did had betrayed the Jewish state in its hour of need.

By the time Vorster set foot in Jerusalem, the idealism of Israel's early years had been replaced by hardened self-interest.

After his visit to Yad Vashem, the erstwhile Nazi sympathizer was treated to an opulent dinner hosted by Prime Minister Rabin, who toasted "the ideals shared by Israel and South Africa: the hopes for justice and peaceful coexistence" during the banquet at the Knesset.[87] A beaming Vorster told the press, "Relations between South Africa and Israel have never been better."[88] The visit gave South Africa a surge of confidence and helped relieve its feelings of growing isolation.

In the South African press, the visit was billed as an event "of profound importance" and "one of the most successful diplomatic coups in [Vorster's] ten years of office." Newspapers praised the prime minister for signing agreements with Israel and delivering "a triumph for his country."[89] For the Jewish community in South Africa, it was "manna from heaven," recalls Mervyn Smith, a longtime member of the Jewish Board of Deputies.[90]

The *Zionist Record*, a mainstream Jewish paper that was usually far less vitriolic than the Revisionist *Herald*, launched into a bitter diatribe against

(From left) Israeli defense minister Shimon Peres, South African prime minister B. J. Vorster, and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Jerusalem, April 1976. CREDIT: RAHAMIM ISRAELI

"the moral degeneration of the UN and its virtual conversion into a tool of communism, terrorism, and moral nihilism [that] have had their inevitable consequences." Tracing Israel's new fondness for South Africa to its betrayal by other African states, the *Record* praised Jerusalem's new diplomatic pragmatism.[91]

While this reflected the mainstream view within the South African Jewish community, a minority of left-wing Jews opposed the Vorster visit. "Here was the guy who was the ultimate monster in South Africa, who had rammed through all of these appalling laws and then become prime minister, was grinding people into the ground," recalled Benjamin Pogrund, then deputy editor of the liberal *Rand Daily Mail*. "And to see *him* at Yad Vashem as an honored guest, I just thought was beyond the pale."[92]

Much to the chagrin of Pogrund and other dissenters, leaders of the South African Jewish community invited Vorster to another banquet in his honor when he returned to South Africa. As news of the event spread, more opponents began to speak out.

Dennis Diamond was executive director of the Board of Deputies at the time of Vorster's trip to Israel. Diamond was a rarity in that he came not from Cape Town or Johannesburg but from rural Natal, spoke fluent Zulu, and published poetry in Afrikaans. He was also several decades younger than most members of the organization he would be leading. Diamond had risen to that prominent position at the age of twenty-eight with the encouragement of Mendel Kaplan, a steel magnate and prominent Jewish and Zionist leader sometimes referred to as the "King of the Jews" in South Africa.

Diamond, who now lives on a quiet, tree-lined street in Jerusalem, describes the Vorster visit as "a terrible and amazing thing." Looking back, he remains torn. "We thought it was very good that relations had improved between the two. We hoped that would lead to better things, we hoped that the relationship with Israel would challenge South Africa generally to change its social structure."[93] But such hopes were unrealistic in 1976. The Israeli moralism of the 1960s was a thing of the past: far from echoing Golda Meir's denunciations of apartheid, Prime Minister Rabin was now toasting the two countries' shared ideals and Peres was speaking of "their common hatred of injustice."

On May 10, as a group of angry Jewish university students protested

outside, Cape Town's Heerengracht Hotel hosted a gala affair boasting a guest list that included the entire National Party cabinet. Inside the ornate, five-star hotel, Diamond recalls sitting beside colleagues and friends who opposed the banquet. Toward the end of the evening, board chairman David Mann—an old acquaintance of Vorster's from their days as lawyers at the Johannesburg bar—rose to give a speech with the prime minister sitting directly in front of him.

He began by lauding the state's tolerance and endorsing the government's policy of separate development. "South Africa has long affirmed and lived by the political philosophy of cultural pluralism. It has jealously guarded the right of each group of the population to preserve its own traditions and to maintain its own way of life," he affirmed. It was not until the very end that Mann confronted Vorster:

> I believe that there is a wide consensus today that attitudes and practices, the heritage of the past, bearing upon the relations between our various racial groups are no longer acceptable. . . . [We] must move away as quickly and effectively as is practicable from discrimination based on race or colour, and that we must accord to every man and woman respect, and human dignity and the opportunity to develop to their fullest potential.[94]

Diamond was pleased. "Of course there would be those who'd say it could've been more. I think it was perfectly pitched. . . . It was a speech correct for its time."[95] Mendel Kaplan, King of South Africa's Jews, agrees. "Who else stood up and said that?" he asks. "Not the leader of the Anglicans. Maybe we didn't do enough. But the Board of Deputies was not elected to go in the streets and lead a street movement."[96]

Others were not so placated. Dennis Davis, who is now a judge on Cape Town's High Court and a well-known television personality, remembers protesting outside the banquet that night. "It was hardly a rebuke," says Davis. "It was the minimum that could be done to show some sense of commitment to Jewish ethics," and to acknowledge the "controversy that was brewing both outside the hotel and generally that Vorster the Nazi had been invited." At the time, Davis was editor of the Jewish student newspaper, *Strike*, at the University of Cape Town. In its pages, he lashed out at the Jewish community's leaders: "Mr. Vorster is . . . leader of a political party whose policies, based so firmly on race, are the antithesis of the very body and soul of Jewish ethics," he wrote.

"We cannot surely honour and pay homage to the leading proponent of such policies even if he has pulled off a diplomatic coup with Israel."[97]

Davis saw Mann's speech as pathetic. The board had heralded Vorster as a hero and then lightly rapped him on the knuckles.[98] Board dissident Mervyn Smith was even more adamant: "Here he was standing before *Der Führer*, there were a hundred students or a thousand students saying apartheid is evil [outside]. . . . In Vorster's life it was a total nonevent," says Smith. "The crying shame was that the board hosted him."[99]

The Vorster visit may have been hailed as a public relations coup in South Africa, but its primary purpose remained largely obscured. The media in both countries stressed that the agreements signed were limited to trade, investment, and peaceful scientific and industrial cooperation.[100] Only the *Cape Times* hinted briefly at the true reason for the visit, reporting Vorster's stop at the headquarters of Israel Aircraft Industries, where he saw Kfir fighter jets on the assembly line.[101]

Indeed, much of Vorster's time in Israel was spent shopping for weapons. To facilitate this, Admiral Binyamin Telem—the commander of Israel's navy during the Yom Kippur War—joined Ambassador Unna in showing the South African prime minister around Israel. Due in part to the $100 million ammunition contract signed the previous year, Israel's defense industry now had excellent ties with South Africa and Vorster's visit helped seal a much bigger deal, totaling more than $700 million, Telem recalls.[102]

As Vorster casually visited Israeli arms manufacturers and journalists began to notice, pro-Israel organizations abroad sought to convince the public that nothing unseemly was happening. Moshe Decter of the American Jewish Congress insisted in a shrill *New York Times* column that "Israel's small arms trade" with Pretoria was "dwarfed into insignificance by the South African arms traffic of other countries," pointing fingers at France, Britain, and others. He decried the focus on Israel as evidence of "rank cynicism, rampant hypocrisy, and anti-Semitic prejudice."[103]

Soon after, in late 1976, Telem was sent to South Africa at the personal request of Defense Minister Shimon Peres. The navy was the only element of the IDF to emerge from the Yom Kippur War relatively

unscathed, owing largely to the tremendous success of its Reshef missile boats, which, along with the ships smuggled out of Cherbourg, outperformed their Soviet-made counterparts.[104] As the commander of the navy and because one of the first major sales to Pretoria was the 450-ton Reshef attack craft, Telem was a natural choice for the job.[105] Peres even managed to convince Golda Meir, who had stubbornly resisted closer relations with South Africa for over a decade, that Telem's posting to Pretoria was necessary. Meir, no longer at the country's helm, was scarred by the Yom Kippur fiasco. "He went to Golda and she was not very happy with it," recalls Telem. "I think she finally gave in once she realized . . . we needed this relationship economically."[106]

. . .

TELEM HAD BEEN DISPATCHED to a country in flames. A few months before his arrival, black schoolchildren in the sprawling Johannesburg township of Soweto had organized a demonstration against mandatory instruction in Afrikaans—a language most of them did not understand and many of their teachers could not even speak. Early in the morning, thousands of students in school uniforms poured into the streets, converging at a high school in the Orlando section of the township. The security forces were caught off guard and released police dogs into the crowd, followed by tear gas and live ammunition. Students reacted by pelting police with stones and officers fired on them as they fled, gunning down dozens. A single image—showing a weeping man fleeing the police with the bloody, limp, uniformed body of thirteen-year-old Hector Pieterson in his arms alongside the dead boy's screaming sister—was splashed across the front pages of newspapers worldwide and came to symbolize the brutality of the South African government. Urban unrest spread quickly, prompting further police violence throughout the country and the greatest outpouring of international outrage that Pretoria had ever seen. The riots lasted for months and the death toll exceeded five hundred, dwarfing the sixty-nine killed in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960.

As many Western countries began to formally distance themselves from the apartheid regime, Israel Shipyards signed a contract to build six Reshef missile boats for South Africa and a licensing agreement was concluded for the remainder to be built in Durban. It was a boon for both sides. "They were able to develop their own military industries by using

our know-how and our expertise which we sold sometimes, I thought, too easily," says Telem. "But we did because we were very much in need of this relationship."[107]

Naval officers and engineers began streaming back and forth between Israel and South Africa and Rabin gave the relationship "the highest priority," insisting that it take place under the table in order to maintain deniability and prevent negative publicity. "Nothing was official," recalls Telem. He therefore performed the duties of a military attaché but on paper held the title "counselor," as his predecessor had, in order to avoid any attention and maintain the secrecy of the Defense Ministry's mission in Pretoria.[108]

At the Israeli embassy in Pretoria, Telem and Ambassador Unna got along well, maintaining an understanding to stay out of each other's business. Following the model Peres established during the 1950s in France, the Defense Ministry and its export office all but eclipsed career diplomats when it came to conducting foreign relations in South Africa, where arms sales were crucial.[109]

Israel was not only building and modernizing weapons; it was also offering formal advice to the South African military. In 1976, the Israeli Defense Ministry sent Colonel Amos Baram as a special adviser to the chief of the SADF. Baram viewed the situation as one of friendly cooperation and was happy to advise the South Africans. His attitude was, "We have a common interest—security problems. Not just borders, internal problems too." The challenge was not simply fighting communist troops in Angola, but helping South Africa maintain domestic security, according to Baram. "If you know how to defend yourself against an enemy outside the borders you know how to deal [with him] within your borders."

Baram's first recommendation was to extend the term of military service in South Africa to a compulsory two years. He also attempted to shift the SADF's doctrine away from the British system toward the Israeli one, incorporate a full year of training for new soldiers instead of three months, and to reform the staff command school.[110] During Baram's two years in South Africa, the period of compulsory service for white males—the only soldiers for whom conscription was required—did in fact increase to two years. More and more reservists were called up to serve under a new active-reserve duty requirement that lasted eight years, eventually leading to widespread protests against conscription.[111]

Baram and Telem were often invited to join the army chief, General

Constand Viljoen, on trips to the front lines. Viljoen, a serious, intelligent farmer-turned-soldier, was the archetypal military man. He was born into an aristocratic rural Afrikaner family whose lineage went back to the seventeenth century and he had risen quickly through the ranks to become chief of the army, and eventually head of the SADF. His identical twin brother, Braam Viljoen, had gone in the opposite direction, studying theology. When his moral opposition to apartheid alienated him from the Dutch Reformed Church, he had joined forces with the black political and religious leaders that his brother's men sought to silence and defeat. As Braam immersed himself in the liberation theology of the South African Council of Churches—considered a terrorist front by the government—his brother, Constand, was spearheading South Africa's invasion of Angola and managing its aftermath.[112]

In the wake of South Africa's failed intervention, General Viljoen was eager to learn all he could from the Israelis. "We flew with his official plane a lot to Angola," recalls Telem. "He used to take us along and ask our opinion on everything."[113] The two Israelis were also taken on a security-oriented helicopter tour of the Mozambican border and afterward treated to a stay, with their wives, in South Africa's premier safari spot—the Kruger National Park.[114]

Telem insists that he had no qualms about selling Israeli arms to South Africa, especially the Reshef boats, which he did not envision being used against South African blacks. But he was tremendously unsettled by the country's racism. When Telem discovered that the German embassy paid its black workers ten times more than the Israeli embassy, he was shocked by the disparity and demanded authorization from his superiors to pay the same wages as the Germans—a salary that would put black workers on par with the Jewish South African and Israeli employees at the office. His superiors at the Defense Ministry—generally immune to moral arguments when it came to arms sales—agreed with Telem about workers' rights, telling him that they refused to pay "apartheid wages." Telem was able to give his chauffeur such a massive raise that the driver began building himself a new house, but draconian apartheid laws that controlled blacks' movements and banned interracial relationships continued to grate on Telem's conscience.

Nevertheless, he continued his job, which required him to interact continuously with leading SADF and Armscor officials. "We had an excellent understanding on the professional side, I would not say the same on the political side," Telem recounts. "I had to go along with it, but the longer I stayed in South Africa, the more it became difficult for me to cooperate with them."[115]

The turning point came when the head of Armscor, Piet Marais, invited Telem and his wife to spend a long weekend at his farm in the countryside. Marais was a Boer to the bone. With a farmer's rough hands and reeking of tobacco, he spoke English with a harsh Afrikaans accent.[116] At his farm, this pipe-smoking proponent of white supremacy set out to convince Telem of apartheid's virtues. "He tried to persuade me that our way of trying to solve the Israeli problem [with] Palestinians is the best way and we should carry on with it even though we were an occupying, we still are, an occupying entity," says Telem. Marais attempted to persuade him that Israel "should further apartheid as [South Africans] do . . . in the name of the God of Israel." It was too much for Telem. Soon afterward, he asked to be transferred home.[117]

By contrast, Telem's good friend Colonel Baram had no such reservations. Baram never raised his voice against apartheid. "How could I? I was advising them on how to defend it," he says bluntly. Those who don't like it, says Baram, should "stay at home." The dramatically different perspectives of Telem and Baram, who remain friends to this day, are closely related to their domestic politics in Israel now. While Telem speaks regretfully of the ongoing occupation, Baram describes Israel's Arab citizens as "a cancer" and advocates gerrymandering electoral districts to prevent any Arab majorities capable of electing Arab members to the Knesset.[118]

Unlike Telem, Ambassador Unna did not let moral qualms stop him from carrying on with his work. When he returned as full ambassador in 1974, Unna was already acquainted with many South African politicians from his first stint in the country as consul-general. He and the South African intelligence chief, Hendrik van den Bergh, had become even closer in the wake of a hostage crisis in downtown Johannesburg.

On the morning of April 28, 1975, an employee of the Israeli consulate crept into the downtown Johannesburg building housing the consular offices and shot the mission's chief security officer. The shooter took the

entire office staff hostage, claiming it was a security exercise. Initially, the South African authorities thought they were dealing with terrorists. They soon discovered that the consulate had been seized by a mentally unstable Jewish South African named David Protter, who had once served in the Israeli army and had been hired as a security guard despite warnings from high-level officials about his psychological problems. Protter and his younger brother used the consulate's formidable arsenal to fire at police and snipers through the windows, injuring more than forty people caught in the crossfire. It was Johannesburg's first full-scale hostage crisis, and crowds of onlookers camped out overnight with blankets and picnic baskets to watch the spectacle unfold. Van den Bergh took control of the scene, commandeering the phones of a nearby shopkeeper to keep an emergency line open for instructions from Prime Minister Rabin in Jerusalem.[119] Protter finally surrendered the next morning, descending in an elevator behind a human shield of hostages.[120]

The Fox Street crisis cemented Unna's friendship with van den Bergh and they began to see each other socially. At the time, Unna and his wife were living in the luxurious twin towers on the slope of Table Mountain in Cape Town—South Africa's legislative capital during parliamentary sessions. They enjoyed a panoramic vista from their balcony, overlooking the city, the harbor, and the steep face of the mountain.[121] Unna found van den Bergh surprisingly forthcoming with political gossip after he'd had a few drinks. And although his habit of leaning over the railing to enjoy the view while sipping vodka made Unna extremely nervous, van den Bergh's visits proved to be an invaluable asset for the Israeli embassy.

Yet ironically, despite his close friendship with the man many regarded as the power behind Vorster's throne, Unna was arguably the most outspoken critic of apartheid in the diplomatic community. Television had only reached South Africa in early 1976, and Unna was invited by the South African Broadcasting Corporation to be the first foreign guest interviewed live on screen. He conducted the interview in Afrikaans, explaining that Jews could not accept apartheid because it was humiliating and discriminatory. The next morning, Unna went to see Information Minister Connie Mulder, who congratulated him on his interview. Unna was shocked. He asked Mulder if he had not heard his criticism of apartheid. According to Unna's account, Mulder told him, " 'If the

ambassador of Israel appears on our T.V. and speaks in our language, Afrikaans, he can be as critical as he likes, we love to hear him.' "[122]

This was not the only instance of Unna spitting in the face of his hosts. A few years later, he caused a stir by driving his diplomatic car into a black township during a police raid. "The Africans were being hunted like stray dogs, and the look in their faces as they were trying to hide was that of frightened and desperate fugitives," Unna later wrote in his unpublished autobiography.[123] He told the officer in charge that such raids were self-defeating because the "illegal Africans" found to be violating apartheid laws by living in the city without passes simply returned after being expelled to the bantustans. Later that day, he gave a lecture at Stellenbosch University, the Harvard of Afrikanerdom, and told an audience of prominent NP members that the township raid made him "sick"—an outburst that earned him praise from liberal English-language newspapers. Unna caused yet another uproar when he refused to attend a play about the life of Golda Meir because blacks were not allowed in the theater. The entire Pretoria diplomatic corps eventually joined him in boycotting it.[124]

Unna's criticism of apartheid and his closeness with the South African regime's leading figures presents an intriguing paradox. Unlike other Israelis who hypocritically paid lip service to the anti-apartheid movement, Unna followed through with concrete actions. While most diplomats resist the impulse to criticize a host nation's internal policies lest it damage relations, Unna took every opportunity to lambaste apartheid. Despite these outbursts, he was revered by the white minority government more than any other Israeli ambassador in history. Unna claims that "we could get away with anything . . . even our criticism was accepted because it came from friends." Proudly, he adds, "They regarded me personally as an architect of the good relations between Israel and South Africa."[125] This is not boasting; General Magnus Malan, who headed the SADF during Unna's tenure, agrees.

Sipping coffee in the basement of a shopping mall outside Pretoria, the retired general brightened at the mention of Unna: "The relations between South Africa and Israel, I give him the credit for it. He was very good, a hell of a bright chap." And Unna's denunciations of apartheid did not bother him. "He even was prepared to defend that on the SABC and I thought that was fantastic," Malan exclaims. "And he did it in

Afrikaans!"[126] The fact that Unna was not meeting with black political leaders made his personal crusade even less threatening.

Unna's trenchant moral criticisms were heartfelt and genuine but they did not reflect a change in state policy. Malan and other key South African leaders were savvy enough to realize that allowing Unna to criticize them served their interests so long as he didn't seek to undermine the alliance. Condoning and even encouraging Unna's televised outbursts against apartheid made South Africa seem more democratic and tolerant of dissent than it actually was, convinced Israelis of the dubious proposition that they could remain morally pure while selling arms to Pretoria, and permitted the alliance to proceed without a hitch. Only the straitlaced minister of foreign affairs, Brand Fourie, protested Unna's boycott of the Golda Meir play, for which the ambassador refused to apologize.

While Unna abhorred apartheid, he remains unapologetic about his role in furthering ties between Israel and South Africa. He retired long ago and now lives with his wife and cats in a modest condominium in a small subdivision near Netanya built by South African immigrants to Israel. Many of his neighbors have South African ties. As he argues, "We were isolated and here was an important big country developing relations with Israel." Turning down a far-reaching partnership with clear economic benefits—especially when Israel had few other options—would have been anathema to the new foreign policy thinking emanating from Jerusalem in the mid-1970s. Unna maintains that the relationship was "important from a strategic point of view and from a commercial point of view and from a Jewish point of view." The latter, of course, was a less pressing concern. Unna admits, "We structured our whole relationship with South Africa through our trade and our defense relationship."[127]

Unna had learned a valuable lesson in a United Nations bathroom twenty years earlier: vicious criticism of a government on the public stage need not impede close personal relationships with its representatives behind the scenes. It was another instance of the Janus face Israel presented to the world.

The years that Telem, Baram, and Unna spent in South Africa helped to cement the Israeli–South African alliance and bring leading military figures into regular, close contact affording one another an insider's view

of the security operations being carried out against Israel and South Africa's enemies.

South Africa's army chief, Constand Viljoen, visited Israel's occupied territories in the spring of 1977, marveling at the Israeli checkpoint system and the searches of Arabs conducted by soldiers at each roadblock.[128] "The thoroughness with which Israel conducts this examination is astonishing. At the quickest, it takes individual Arabs that come through there about one and a half hours. When the traffic is heavy, it takes from four to five hours," he observed admiringly.[129] In addition to studying how Israel controlled the movement of Palestinians, the SADF was also interested in Israel's battlefield training methods and sent twenty-two members of the army to Israel to study the IDF's combat school with the goal of establishing a replica in South Africa.[130]

Business was thriving, too. The Armscor subsidiary Naschem sent three representatives to Israel Military Industries to study the manufacturing of bombs, while the South African Air Force flew a team to Israel to work on plans for a new, heavily fortified base.[131] Armscor and IMI signed two large contracts for bombs and ammunition and tested them together, paving the way for even closer cooperation between the two countries.[132]

That same month, the South African government entered into final negotiations for yet another massive ammunition contract with IMI, known as Project Decor. After a visit to Israel in late July 1977, Armscor officials reported that they had bargained the contract down from $450 million to $370 million—an amount fifteen times greater than the published International Monetary Fund figure that defenders of Israel used to downplay the extent of Israeli exports to South Africa (the IMF data excluded arms sales).[133] It was the biggest infusion of cash ever from South Africa and a major boost to the Israeli economy. During their visit, the Armscor representatives met Defense Ministry director-general Pinchas Zussman, a university professor turned weapons czar, who greatly impressed them. They reported proudly to Pretoria that "he views the contract as more than a transaction between IMI and Armscor; indeed, he views it as a transaction between two governments, with all that this entails."[134]

By now, the Ford administration, which had aided South Africa's adventure in Angola until Congress shut it down, was out of office. Jimmy Carter had been president for six months when Zussman and the South

Africans negotiated the ammunition contract and Washington's foreign policy had lurched to the left, placing a new emphasis on human rights and nonproliferation. It wasn't long before the White House began to show signs of a tougher stance toward both Israel and South Africa, canceling the sale of five-hundred-pound concussion bombs to Israel and publicly denouncing apartheid soon after Carter entered office. It was not an auspicious time for secret arms deals between international pariahs, and the situation became even more perilous in November 1977, when the U.N. passed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[135]

Reacting to news of the embargo, Moshe Dayan, who had become Israel's foreign minister after his embarrassing fall from grace after the Yom Kippur War, misleadingly told Israeli Radio, "Firstly, whatever the Security Council decides, or has decided, Israel will act accordingly . . . we have no hidden under-the-table relations with the South African government." The South African ambassador in Tel Aviv worried that Dayan might actually honor his word, but privately hoped that Israel would go on "publicly professing to uphold the embargo and, at the same time . . . continuing for as long as possible, covertly, to disregard it."[136]

At Armscor there was no such uncertainty. South African defense officials knew the alliance they had forged was impressive and unique. While covert arms sales occurred in many places during the 1970s, contracts of this magnitude—negotiated at the ministerial level and approved at the highest levels of government at a time of intense international scrutiny—were exceptional. As Zussman had told them, "the size of the recent contract . . . had made a big impression on the whole cabinet."[137] Indeed, by signing it, Israel took a huge political risk and reaped an even greater economic windfall. Three years after Peres and Botha had initiated the alliance, it elevated the Israeli–South African relationship to a whole new level.

The captains of South Africa's arms industry were well aware that the nearly $400 million contract they had just signed would provide a major stimulus to Israel's sagging economy and help the country "to become more independent of the United States through the extension of their own production capacity."[138] As General Tamir had told the visiting spy Dieter Gerhardt back in 1975, Israel needed another leg to stand on. Professor Zussman had found one.

6

A COMMON LOT

Likud, Apartheid, and the Quest for Minority Survival

> And it has further been taught: One should not sell [idolaters] either weapons or accessories of weapons, nor should one grind any weapon for them.
>
> —Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Avodah Zarah, 15b

IN MAY 1977, Menachem Begin's Likud Party stunned the Israeli political establishment by deposing the Labor Party dynasty—dominated by Eastern European Ashkenazi Jews—that had ruled Israel since independence. Begin was from Eastern Europe, too, but much of his support came from the disillusioned masses of immigrant Jews from North Africa and the Arab world who were fed up with the Ashkenazi elite and resented being treated as second-class citizens. Likud took 33 percent of the overall vote and formed a right-wing coalition that excluded the Labor Party from the government for the first time in the nation's history. As opposition leader, Begin had for many years been a proponent of closer and more overt Israeli–South African ties.[1] By 1977, Pretoria had already become Israel's single largest customer for arms, and exports only increased after Begin took office.

Begin's government was more than happy to violate the U.N. embargo against South Africa. Just a week after the international ban on arms sales to Pretoria was approved, a South African army team arrived in Israel to shop for antitank weapons.[2] Begin's brand of neo-Revisionist Zionism emphasized military might, national survival, and the denial of political rights to the enemy. Likud's platform may have appealed to religious settlers, but the party's leaders had little patience for ancient Talmudic dictates forbidding arms sales to oppressive foreigners.

86. Lucretia McCalmont Marmon, "Israel and South Africa: The Odd Couple," *Times of Israel and World Jewish Review*, 1974.
87. In the upper echelons of the South African diplomatic community, there was a growing fear that closer ties with Israel would alienate the Arab states and Iran, upon whom South Africa depended for oil. The secretary of foreign affairs, Brand Fourie, telegraphed Fincham warning that Pretoria's support for Israel during the war meant that South Africa was "widely regarded as one of Israel's very few reliable friends, a contention which is already giving impetus to an oil boycott against us." See DFA, "Krisis in Israel se Afrika Beleid," July 4, 1973, 1/8/6, vol. 2; DFA, "Telegram: S.A. Consul-General, Tehran to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria," July 9, 1974, 1/8/3, vol. 5.
88. David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 50, no. 4 (1994): 41; Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 8; APC, "I.A.E.A.: The Agency's Verification Activities in South Africa: Report by the Director General," September 8, 1993, GOV/2684, 93–03174, 5.
89. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 266; Louw Alberts, interview by author, Pretoria, February 27, 2006.
90. DFA, "Recent Developments in the Relations Between Israel and South Africa . . . ," United Nations General Assembly, A/AC.115/L.383, April 29, 1974, 1/8/3, vol. 2.
91. DFA, "Abdul Minty to Chairman of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid," September 9, 1974, 1/8/3, vol. 2.

5 BROTHERS IN ARMS

1. Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1985), 29.
2. Interview by author, Magnus Malan, Pretoria, February 9, 2006.
3. Sachar, 787.
4. Philip H. Frankel, *Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 65.
5. Magnus Malan, interview by author.
6. Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, "Dynamics of Military Spending in Israel: A Computer Simulation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31, no. 1 (1987): 87–88.
7. Shlaim, 323.
8. Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire*, 272–74. Rabin was also untainted, having never before served in an Israeli cabinet.
9. Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 241, 307–9.
10. Binyamin Telem, interview by author, Beit Yehoshuah, September 20, 2005.
11. Stewart Reiser, *The Israeli Arms Industry: Foreign Policy, Arms Transfers, and Military Doctrine of a Small State* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), 112–13.
12. Ibid., xiii; Klieman, 58.
13. Reiser, 114.
14. Ibid., 111–23. Exports increased from $39 million in 1968 to $70 million in 1973.

15. Ibid., 111–12. This occurred thanks largely to South African contracts.
16. Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, "The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel," *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 2 (1989): 526.
17. Klieman, 124–27.
18. Ibid., 114–17.
19. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, "Israel's 'Security Network' and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38, no. 2 (2006): 235–61.
20. Klieman, 143.
21. Witney W. Schneidman, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2004), 136–39.
22. *South Africa: Defence and Strategic Value*, (London: South African Embassy Department of Information, 1977), 13.
23. Sparks, 183. Although pass laws briefly slowed the pace of black population growth in cities during the 1960s, separate development did not achieve its aim of deurbanization and the creation of white cities.
24. This meant South Africa was willing to pay a premium. There is no evidence of Israeli price gouging, but interviews with several retired SADF officials imply that Pretoria paid more than the market price for many weapons given that Israel was violating the U.N. embargo by selling to them after 1977.
25. To an extent the gold and mineral boom masked underlying stagnation in other sectors such as manufacturing. At this point the arms industry was still in its infancy.
26. See SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3; SANDF, "SECMENT Agreement," April 3, 1975.
27. As reproduced in Eschel Rhoodie, *The Real Information Scandal* (Pretoria: Orbis, 1983), 117.
28. Magnus Malan, interview by author.
29. Dieter Gerhardt, interview by author, Noordhoek, March 8, 2006. The dates given to me in this interview contradict those in a 2000 article. Gerhardt claims the dates cited in that article were incorrect. See Ronen Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience," *Haaretz Magazine* (English edition), April 7, 2000.
30. Ibid.
31. For a brief history of the ISSACOM and strategic intelligence cooperation meetings, see SANDF, "Buitelandse Besoek: H.W.S.: ISSAKOM- en SICOPS Vergaderings: Israel," May 10, 1993, AFD INL 520/3/4/6, vol. 53, 66.
32. SANDF, "Proceedings of Discussions Held at Chief of Staff Intelligence . . . ," January 25, 1975, AMI/HSI MI/LIA/1/5/9, vol. 1, 214.
33. SANDF, "Uitruil van Info met Israel," May 17, 1973, AMI/HSI MI/LIA/1/5/9, vol. 1, 77–84.
34. Liberman, "Israel and the South African Bomb"; SAHA, "The Jericho Weapon System," March 31, 1975. The original Jericho memorandum is reproduced in an appendix to Liberman's article.
35. See SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3, especially the notes regarding the third ISSA meeting. Because the offer of Jericho missiles, potentially armed with nuclear warheads, was discussed at two subsequent meetings in June, it appears that the offer first surfaced during the March 31 meeting, prompting Armstrong's memo and a series of decisions for the matter to be "held in abeyance" until June and then, again, until July 1975.

36. SAHA, "The Jericho Weapon System," March 31, 1975.
37. SANDF, "SECMENT Agreement," 2.
38. Indeed, it is still in effect. On April 23, 2006, the Directorate of Security of the Defense Establishment (Malmab) wrote to Armscor urging that they not release the 1975 document to the author. The SANDF archive released it in mildly redacted form, despite Israeli objections. See SANDF, "Pini Chen to Richardt du Toit: Security Agreement (MLMB/3311–06)," April 23, 2006.
39. The project's code name is corroborated by Dieter Gerhardt in his interview with the author and in other documents contained in SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3.
40. SANDF, "Notes on a Meeting Between Minister S Peres and Minister P W Botha . . . ," June 4, 1975, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3.
41. South Africa's costly clandestine efforts to develop its own indigenous nuclear capability in the following years would have been unnecessary if the Jericho deal had gone through in 1975. Dieter Gerhardt, interview by author.
42. SANDF, "Rules of Procedure (Annexure B)," June 30, 1975, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3., states, "Requests by A.B. [Armaments Board] for purchases from other sources (non Israeli) will be processed directly by the M.O.D./ Defence Sales Office in response to A.B. specific request."
43. SANDF, "State of Israel: Ministry of Defence: Directorate of Procurement and Production: Ref No. Mh/L/150.3/319," 1975 (undated), HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3.
44. "Notes on a Meeting Between Minister S Peres and Minister P W Botha . . ."
45. Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 74–78.
46. SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3.
47. This claim is based on the data provided by Klieman and Reiser that approximates Israeli arms exports as well as IMI's exports during the 1970s (the ballpark figure for 1975 is $270 million). Klieman, 77–88; Reiser, 111–12. In fact, the IMI deal alone exceeds the annual total provided by Klieman.
48. Schneidman, 199–200.
49. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 276; Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 49.
50. Gleijeses, 259.
51. SANDF, "Planning Procedures: Operational Research . . . ," September 15, 1975, HSI/AMI Z/7/3/4/1, 35.
52. Gleijeses, 243. The Soviets had in fact cut back aid to Angola after 1972 and the bulk of assistance came from Tito's Yugoslavia. Soviet aid resumed in 1974, but it was Cuba that became the most influential force in the region.
53. For details of the Cuban intervention in Algeria from 1961 to 1962 and the Cuban military mission to Zaire—led by Che Guevara—in 1965, see Gleijeses, 30–56, 101–3.
54. NSA, "Conversacion Con El Embajador Sovietico," January 13, 1976; NSA, "Cuban Military Intervention in Angola: Report," January 6, 1976.
55. Schneidman, 208.
56. Ibid., 218.

57. Dick Clark, interview by author, Washington, November 15, 2005.
58. Gleijeses, 332.
59. William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 15.
60. In addition to Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, see Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War: White Power and the Crisis in Southern Africa* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1983), 77–79; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978).
61. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making* (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984), 76–77, describes Pretoria as feeling the United States had "pulled the carpet" from under them. See also Robert S. Jaster, "South African Defense Strategy and the Growing Influence of the Military," in *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, William J. Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 30.
62. Gleijeses, 299.
63. Mintz and Ward, "The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel," 529; Reiser, 136.
64. Abraham A. Ben-Zvi, *Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence: The Case of the US and Israel, 1975–1983* (Boulder: Westview, 1984), 16. For a detailed analysis of the reassessment crisis of 1975, see Abraham A. Ben-Zvi, *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 77–102.
65. "The Israeli Connection," *The Economist*, November 5, 1977.
66. Reiser, 130.
67. Rabin, 261. Rabin's views on the causes and consequences of the reassessment crisis are discussed on pages 253–75. Not surprisingly, he does not mention South Africa, given the secrecy surrounding those ties.
68. Dieter Gerhardt, interview by author.
69. Iran was involved in developing missiles with Israel prior to 1979. After the fall of the Shah, Israel looked to South Africa to help fund and jointly develop a missile system. See William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 452–53; Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience."
70. Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience."
71. For a discussion of this hardening, see Rabin, 256; Ben-Zvi, *The United States and Israel*, 98–99.
72. See SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/23/6/1, vol. 3.
73. Andrew J. Pierre, "Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 60, no. 2 (Winter 1981–1982): 269.
74. Gleijeses, 231.
75. Klieman, 35.
76. Reiser, 214; Klieman, 40–41.
77. James Sanders, *Apartheid's Friends: The Rise and Fall of South Africa's Secret Service* (London: John Murray, 2006), 94–99.
78. Rhoodie, 113. Rhoodie used Oscar Hurwitz, a prominent Pretoria Jewish businessman, and contacts in the United States to forge connections in Israel.

79. Ibid., 110–11.
80. Ibid., 118.
81. Ibid., 115–16.
82. Unna, 127. "I was rather surprised when I got to know about it. It was decided at [a] very high level in Israel," recalls Unna.
83. According to most sources, Rhoodie, Mulder, and van den Bergh were the masterminds of the visit. However, Rhoodie's autobiography and a 1983 article suggest that Oscar Hurwitz played a major role in pushing Vorster to go to Israel. See David Braun, "Propaganda War Aimed at Israel and Black States: Prominent Jewish Lawyer Played a Major Role in Softening Attitudes Towards S.A.," *The Star*, December 1, 1983.
84. See, for example, Naomi Chazan, "Israel's 'Shortsighted' Policy on South Africa," *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, April 20, 1976.
85. Editorial, *Jerusalem Post*, April 11, 1976.
86. Arthur Goldreich, interview by author.
87. Joseph, 26.
88. John Scott, "Vorster: No Arms Deal," *Cape Times*, April 10, 1976.
89. "Bold Move," *Cape Times*, April 14, 1976; John Scott, "Visit Triumph for Vorster," *Cape Times*, April 12, 1976.
90. Mervyn Smith, interview by author, Cape Town, February 22, 2005.
91. "Historic Pact: Joint Cabinet Is World First," *Zionist Record & SA Jewish Chronicle*, April 14, 1976.
92. Benjamin Pogrund, interview by author.
93. Dennis Diamond, interview by author, Jerusalem, December 19, 2004.
94. JBOD, "Address Delivered by Mr. D. K. Mann . . . ," May 10, 1976, D. K. Mann Biography File.
95. Dennis Diamond, interview by author.
96. Mendel Kaplan, interview by author, Johannesburg, March 7, 2005.
97. Dennis Davis, interview by author, Cape Town, February 28, 2005; Dennis Davis, "Guess Who Came to Dinner?," *Strike*, May 1976.
98. Ibid.
99. Mervyn Smith, interview by author.
100. For an example of Israeli coverage, see Landau, "Vorster Denies Arms Deal . . . ," *Jerusalem Post*, April 11, 1976.
101. John Scott, "Vorster: No Arms Deal," *Cape Times*, April 10, 1976; John Scott, "Vorster Signs Pact with Israel," *Cape Times*, April 13, 1976.
102. "Israel and South Africa; Just Looking," *The Economist*, April 17, 1976; Terence Smith, "Vorster Visit to Israel Arouses Criticism," *New York Times*, April 18, 1976; Binyamin Telem, interview by author.
103. Moshe Decter, "Israel and South Africa," *New York Times*, November 11, 1976.
104. Klieman, 86.
105. See SANDF, HSI/AMI Z/7/3/4/1, 43–51.
106. Binyamin Telem, interview by author.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Klieman, 102–3; Oren Barak and Chanan Kahan, *Misrad Ha'chutz-Li'an?* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 2006), 14–15.
110. Amos Baram, interview by author, Netanya, September 22, 2005.
111. Leonard, 11.

112. John Carlin, *Playing the Enemy: Nelson Mandela and the Game That Made a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 96–102.
113. Binyamin Telem, interview by author.
114. SANDF, "Provision of Transport: Visit of Maj General Holtzhausen and Group," November 28, 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 2, 94.
115. Binyamin Telem, interview by author.
116. Richardt van der Walt, Hannes Steyn, and Jan van Loggerenberg, *Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Experience* (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse 2005), 48.
117. Binyamin Telem, interview by author.
118. Amos Baram, interview by author.
119. Unna, 110–16; Yitzhak Unna, interview by author, Netanya, August 24, 2005.
120. Van den Bergh arrested Protter and, seemingly inexplicably, drove him and Unna to the van den Bergh home in Pretoria before taking Protter to jail. South Africa's intelligence chief considered Protter clinically insane and insisted on affording him the dignity of breakfast before he began a life sentence in jail. Protter was released in 1995 and now runs a private security company called Rescue 911 in Mpumalanga Province. Protter spoke with me by phone on two occasions but declined to meet due to his busy schedule and did not respond to written questions regarding his motivations for the Fox Street hostage crisis.
121. Unna, 125.
122. Ibid., 120.
123. Ibid., 122.
124. "Pass Raid Arrests Made Envoy Feel Sick," *The Star*, March 15, 1979; "A Sick-Making Law," *Cape Times*, March 16, 1979; Unna, 137–38.
125. Yitzhak Unna, interview by author.
126. Magnus Malan, interview by author.
127. Yitzhak Unna, interview by author. It is also possible that Unna felt it necessary to compensate for Israel's material aid to the apartheid state with moral denunciations. Nevertheless, his abhorrence of apartheid seems genuine and unstaged even today.
128. SANDF, "C S.A.D.F. (Cape) to C Army," March 4, 1977, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 1d.
129. SANDF, "Verslag oor besoek aan Israeli Weermag deur Hoofleer en Direkteur Beplanning, Leerhoofkwartier," March 18, 1977, HSAW 520/3/4/6, vol. 1.
130. SANDF, "Visit to Argus: Members of the SA Army," July 22, 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 61.
131. SANDF, "Visit to Cane: Hoedspruit Communications System," July 29, 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 115; SANDF, "Visit to Israel: Air Force Planning Team," July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 47.
132. SANDF, "Drop Tests—Proj Limbo," June 24–July 8, 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 102–5; Tienie Groenewald, interview by author (#2), Pretoria, July 6, 2006.
133. SANDF, "Verslag oor Besoek aan Argus oor die periode 18 Tot 28 Julie 1977," July 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 1, 133. This disparity can be discerned by comparing data from the IMF Department of Trade Statistics, at http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/imf/dots.asp, with the much higher annual totals totals from AFD, "Armscor Confidential Information: Bestel/Verskaffer Report," July 11, 2006.
134. Ibid., 130.

135. Barry Schweid, Associated Press, February 17, 1977.
136. SANDF, "Israeli Reaction to U.N. Arms Embargo Against South Africa," November 17, 1977, AMI/MI 204/3/17, 19.
137. "Verslag Oor Besoek aan Argus oor die Periode 18 Tot 28 Julie 1977," 129.
138. Ibid.

6 A COMMON LOT

1. "Begin Urges Friendship with S.A.," *Jewish Herald*, November 2, 1971; Shindler, *Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream*, 56.
2. SANDF, "Evaluasie: Tenkafkeerwapens en Outomatiese Teikenstelsels," October 26, 1977, AMI 520/3/4/6, vol. 2, 82.
3. Shindler, *The Triumph of Military Zionism: Nationalism and the Origins of the Israeli Right* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 206.
4. Known alternately as the Irgun or by its Hebrew acronym, Etzel.
5. Shavit, 227.
6. Shimoni, *The Zionist Ideology*, 249.
7. Shavit, 365.
8. Ibid.
9. Shindler, *Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream*, 21.
10. For an insider's perspective of the split, see Lankin, 43–45. Lehi was initially known as the Irgun Tzvai Leumi b'Yisrael.
11. Shavit, 232–33; Sasson Sofer, *Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 252–54, 263–64. Indeed, Lehi turned to Stalin after World War II, seeing the Soviet Union as the most reliable anti-British power in the postwar world.
12. Shavit, 231.
13. Ibid., 231–33; Sofer, 265. The borders of the British Mandate territory of Transjordan are roughly the same as those of present-day Jordan.
14. Shindler, *Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream*, 28. Begin's comment also revealed his low regard for black South Africans and it suggests that he deemed their liberation struggle less legitimate than his own.
15. Lankin disputes the view that this turned Churchill against the Zionist movement. See Lankin, 93.
16. Michael Makovsky, *Churchill's Promised Land: Zionism and Statecraft* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 216–17.
17. For a detailed account of the Hunting Season, see Lankin, 97–110. Lankin also provides documentary evidence that World Zionist Organization leader Chaim Weizmann boasted of the successes of the Season to his friends in the British government. At the time of the Season, Weizmann's WZO was lobbying for support in Western capitals; Ben-Gurion's Jewish Agency for Palestine, which acted as a government for Palestine's Jews prior to Israeli statehood, had encouraged Jews to join the British war effort against the Nazis. The more moderate Revisionist movement, still hewing to Jabotinsky's line, condemned Lehi and Irgun violence against Britain.
18. Lankin, 224–25.
19. Shavit, 335.
20. Ehud Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 27.

21. Sofer, 236–37. Begin allegedly followed the advice of his operations officer, Amichai Paglin. One of the IDF officers commanding forces on the beach and lobbing grenades at the Irgun men was a young colonel named Yitzhak Rabin.
22. For a detailed first-person account, see Lankin, 335–44. For its part, Lehi protested partition by assassinating Swedish U.N. mediator Folke Bernadotte in September 1948. For a riveting account of the assassination, see Kati Marton, *A Death in Jerusalem* (New York: Arcade, 1996).
23. Ilan Peleg, *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977–1983: Israel's Move to the Right* (New York: Greenwood, 1987), 5.
24. Begin did not simply seek to resettle West Bank areas surrounding Jerusalem that Jews had occupied prior to the War of Independence in 1948, but all of biblical Judea and Samaria. This area covered the entire West Bank and included many areas populated almost exclusively by Palestinians. Although Begin's settlement push represented a confluence of interests among secular Revisionist-inspired ideologues and messianic religious Zionists, there were also a number of prominent Labor Party intellectuals and politicians who advocated settlement. See Gorenberg, *The Accidental Empire*.
25. See Avineri, 171–80. Here, Avineri discusses Jabotinsky's praise for the Ukrainian nationalist poet Taras Shevchenko. Jabotinsky excused the poet's "explosions of wild fury against the Poles, the Jews and other neighbours" in appreciation of the larger nationalist project.
26. Ofira Seliktar, *New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 182; Barak and Sheffer, 235–61.
27. David Hacohen, "Partition for South Africa," *Jerusalem Post*, July 8, 1977.
28. Dennis Diamond, interview by author.
29. A caveat to this interpretation should be noted. Revisionism, in its post-1944 incarnation, was an explicitly revolutionary movement calling for armed revolt. This particular element of its message was understandably admired by some on the revolutionary left. In South Africa, Menachem Begin's memoir *The Revolt* appealed to Nelson Mandela, who read it in prison, while Begin was supporting the government of his captors.
30. Van der Walt, Steyn, and van Loggerenberg, 41.
31. Reiss, 9–10, 36n16–17.
32. The conflicting claims between Buys's account and that found in Reiss likely arise from the projected date of highly enriched uranium output from South Africa's "Y-Plant." Some HEU was produced in early 1978 but later that year there was a "massive catalytic in-process gas reaction between the UF6 and the hydrogen carrier gas" that resulted in the Y-Plant's closure until April 1980 and a delay in its next significant HEU production until July 1981. This set back the construction of the next bombs until 1982. See Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," *Arms Control Today* 25 (December 1995–January 1996): 4–5. The Y-Plant's closure is disputed without substantiating evidence in Nicholas Badenhorst and Pierre Victor, *Those Who Had the Power* (Pretoria: Pierre Victor, 2006), 30.
33. Murrey Marder and Don Oberdorfer, "How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test, Keeping S. Africa Out of the Nuclear Armaments Club," *Washington Post*, August 28, 1977.
34. Bergman, "Treasons of Conscience."
35. Van der Walt, Steyn, and van Loggerenberg, 40. The embassy officials using this